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Abstract This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary
Union (LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian
Monetary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the European
Monetary Union (EMU). The term ‘monetary union’ can be defined either narrowly or
broadly depending on how closely it conforms to Mundell’s notion of ‘Optimal
Currency Area’. After examining each of the historical monetary unions from this
perspective, the article concludes that none of them ever truly conformed to Mundell’s
concept, nor does the EMU. Nevertheless, the article argues that some lessons may be
learned from these historical experiences. First, it is necessary that there exist robust
institutions such as a common central bank and a unified fiscal policy in order to
withstand external shocks. The three early unions could not withstand the shock of
WWI. Another important lesson is that continuing national rivalries can undermine any
monetary union.
Keywords Latin monetary union . Scandinavianmonetary union . Austro-Hungarian
monetary union . Europeanmonetary union . Eurozone crisis . European Central Bank
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1 Introduction
This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary Union
(LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian Mone-
tary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the current European
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Monetary Union (EMU). The three cases were chosen because they are all in Europe
and, at least in some respects, may be seen as pre-cursors of the EMU (Loughlin and
Ryan 2014).
A monetary union is one where there is a single fiat currency with a single monetary
authority (a central bank). It also has a single interest and exchange rate, and a single
legal entity responsible for issuing that currency across a geographic area. This
combination of features required for a true monetary union suggests that many previous
monetary unions, including the LMU and SMU were not monetary unions as such,
while the AHMU was and the Eurozone is. The SMU, at least before 1901, was similar
to the LMU in being largely a common standardization of weights and measures,
although after 1901 it came closer to being a monetary union, even though the
currencies of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway still existed in distinct forms and there
was no common interest rate.
The term ‘monetary union’, however, is used in a somewhat looser way in this
article to refer to the LMU, SMU, AHMU, and the Eurozone, with the appropriate
addition of caveats to indicate the diversity of arrangements grouped under this
heading. Special attention is paid, in particular, to the importance of economic and
political integration in the success and failure of historical monetary unions, with the
goal of shedding light on the fraught question of whether sustained successful monetary
union is possible without high levels of economic convergence in the common currency
area and indeed fiscal and banking union. The article also discusses the political and
institutional aspects and whether some kind of federal set of arrangements is necessary
in order to sustain monetary union successfully. Focus on the EMU is not without
interest, not least because these earlier failed experiments in monetary union helped to
shape the modern EMU and Eurozone (Vanthoor 1996).
The article discusses the formation and progression of the EMU both institutionally
and politically. Finally, it will draw some lessons from the case studies relevant to the
Eurozone Crisis. Although there is a vast historical gulf separating these late-
nineteenth-century monetary unions from the present, they provide ‘food for thought’
for policy makers and commentators attempting to think through the complications
facing the Eurozone (Donovan et al. 2010 and Deo et al. 2011).
2 The Latin monetary union (LMU)
The LMU possesses a special place in any study of monetary unions because of its
importance in the history of European integration and as a source of inspiration for
subsequent monetary unions. Of course, it must be remembered that the Monetary
Convention’s (1865) LMU between France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland did not
create a monetary union as such, but instead represented a relatively narrow coinage
agreement. While the treaty described the intention of Bforming between them [i.e., the
member states] a monetary union^, its focus was on the Buniformity of weights,
measures, and money .^ The LMU thus represented a standardisation of specie, which
can be thought of as a fixed exchange rate between gold and silver. At the time, debate
raged about whether it was advisable to adopt a gold standard system, like the British,
or a bimetallic or double standard of gold and silver (Bordo 1992).
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The LMU was originally envisaged as a bimetallic agreement, in line with French
preference towards bimetallism, with a set exchange rate between gold and silver of
15.5:1. Despite this, however, the LMU eventually transitioned into an effective gold
standard in 1878 with a fixed exchange rate and silver being redeemable for gold.
Interestingly, in the lead up to the creation of the LMU there were visionary proposals
for creating a much broader international currency, which might have included the
United Kingdom, Germany, and even the United States. The French economist and
politician Félix Esquirou de Parieu envisaged such a union as the first step in a process
of European (even global) integration, which he hoped would culminate in the creation
of a full common currency, and, as he envisaged somewhat precociously, a BEuropean
Union^ directed by a BEuropean Commission^ (Einaudi 2001).
Assessing the success of the LMU in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries is difficult. The last few decades of the LMU were extremely turbulent and
witnessed a number of convulsions. As such, the failure of the LMU was a long time
coming, but the union witnessed a decline from the 1870s onwards, in light of
difficulties connected to the debasement of silver and fluctuations between the values
of gold and silver. These difficulties were, in part, based upon a decision by Giacomo
Antonelli, the administrator of the Papal Treasury, a man sometimes called by his
contemporaries the BItalian Richelieu^, to engage in an extensive coinage of debased
silver, which was widely circulated throughout the LMU. Eventually, Swiss and French
bankers rejected these coins. Despite this, the decreased value of silver made it
profitable to exchange silver for gold at the set standard of 15.5: 1, and from 1873
onwards the LMU was forced to limit free conversion of silver. The final nail in the
coffin of the LMUwas the Great War, although the LMU officially operated until 1927.
The Swiss Bank UBS has produced a report on the history of currency unions which
concluded that the BLatin Monetary Union was no monetary union in the modern sense
of the word, and it offers little guidance to the Euro^ (Deo et al. 2011). In a certain sense,
this is true. The LMU is truly vastly different from the current arrangements witnessed in
the Eurozone. Despite this, however, some useful insights that can be gleaned. The
major lessons of the LMU are two-fold. First of all, the negotiations leading to the
adoption of the LMU point to the difficulty of creating (and maintaining) a monetary
union in light of national interests. Then, as is the case now, there was scepticism in the
United Kingdom and, to a lesser degree, Germany, about the efficacy of a European-
wide monetary union. Interestingly, a Blittle Englander^ and anti-European press was
influential in reducing any British hopes of entering into an international currency union.
Similar nationalist pressures existed in Germany, and served to scupper involvement in
the LMU, which incidentally was termed a Latin Monetary Union by a British press
wishing to emphasise the inadvisability of Anglo-German participation. Remembering
the importance of national sentiment is particularly important today as the Eurozone
crisis showed resentments build both in debtor and creditor nations.
Second, the LMU can be seen as illustrating the danger of insufficient coordination
of member states within a monetary union. The LMU, as a rather loose programme for
standardising specie exchange rates, provided far too much scope for national power
and independence in the issuing of coinage. This paved the way for the subsequent
introduction of debased silver, which helped to bring the LMU to its end. Insufficient
centralisation and a lack of institutional safeguards allowed national political actors to
pursue their own economic interests to the detriment of the LMU’s collective interests.
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What was lacking in LMU was a set of institutions such as a central bank, a
sovereign entity capable of determining interest rates, and a system of fiscal transfers
in cases of asymmetrical shocks. In that period of history, it was inconceivable, at least
in the countries of southern Europe that formed the core of the LMU, that such
institutions could be created given the overriding concept of national sovereignty that
was then at its height.
3 The Scandinavian monetary union (SMU)
The SMU, which has been described by de Cecco as Bthe most successful of all
European currency unions^, was partially inspired by the LMU, and was deeply tied
to the rise of a political Scandinavism (De Cecco 1992), It is worth mentioning again
that the SMU did not represent a proper monetary union, as that term is often used
today. Moreover, it is essential to delineate two discrete Bphases^ of the SMU, with
different characteristics. Between 1875 and 1901 (Phase I), the SMU was somewhat
similar to the LMU in being largely a common standardisation of weights and
measures. The year 1901, however, marked a turning point, and between 1901 and
1905 (Phase II), the union came much closer to being a monetary union in the proper
sense of the word. Under Phase II, the SMU ceased being a mere standardisation of
specie, but instead became a fiat currency union, although one which was based upon
specie. Under this system currency notes from the SMU member states circulated
freely, as long as they could be converted to specie. Despite this, however, the
currencies of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway still existed in distinct form and there
was no common interest rate among the member states.
The SMU originally included Denmark and Sweden in 1873, and later, in 1875,
included Norway, which, although in union with Sweden at that point, had full internal
autonomy. The SMU was different from the LMU, however, in that it was not
bimetallic, but instead rested upon the gold standard. Under the terms of the original
union, the coinage was required to be of identical weight and composition. This shifted,
however, as currency came to be included under the terms of SMU in 1901, and the
three central banks of the member states agreed to allow the drawing of drafts on each
other at par. Under the criteria of what constitutes an Optimal Currency Area (OCA),
the SMU must be seen as somewhat problematic. In part, this may have been because
of a lost opportunity in free trade, due to the failure to increase intra-Scandinavian trade
during this same period, which would have inevitably increased economic symmetry.
Whether this would have happened eventually is unknown as the SMU, like the LMU,
foundered as a result of the impact of the First World War.
Perhaps, there are, once again, two major lessons to be drawn from the experience of
the SMU. The conditions were actually quite propitious in the Scandinavian countries
as they share similar languages and cultures and even in the nineteenth century, already
imitated each other’s policy approaches. There were, however – and this is the first
lesson – great economic disparities across the different countries. This points to the
problem of the creation of a monetary union without sufficient economic convergence
among its member states. The SMU, therefore, according to Bergman, never truly
qualified as an OCA, because of this lack of economic convergence. The second lesson
is the need for a common framework of economic structures and fiscal institutions for a
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currency union to be successful, including, at the bare minimum the reduction of trade
barriers, in part to align member states’ economies with one another. There was no
central bank, no sovereign entity setting interest rates and no system of fiscal transfers
to respond to asymmetrical shocks. A true currency union was almost achieved in 1894
when the Norwegian and Swedish central banks agreed to accept each other’s bank
notes at par. Denmark joined this union in 1901. However, no single bank note emerged
and the three countries each controlled their own money supplies (Deo et al. 2011).
Despite the features they held in common, monetary union proved difficult because,
in practice, nationalist sentiment was also high with rivalries between the three
countries. To illustrate this further, Norway finally broke the union with Sweden in
1905. Following this the exchange between the three central banks ceased. This meant
that the union became more of a fixed exchange rate regime with notes and coins
circulating freely within the three countries (Deo et al. 2011).
4 The Austro-Hungarian monetary union (AHMU)
The AHMU has largely avoided the attention of historians, and is often not classified as
a Bmonetary union^ per se, but instead as a dynastic agglomeration sharing a common
currency. This, however, is not entirely fair, and in some regards the AHMU more
closely approximates a true monetary union in the modern sense of the term, than either
the LMU or the SMU. The AHMU was created through an agreement known as the
1867 Compromise between Austria and Hungary, but in the words of historian Marc
Flandreau, it is important to remember that the BAustro-Hungarian union was not the
result of a monetary marriage but the by-product of a fiscal divorce^ (Flandreau 2006).
The 1867 Compromise at its core ensured that Austria and Hungary shared a common
currency, although they remained fiscally sovereign, independent entities. The AHMU
offers, therefore, some interesting lessons and insights into the operation of monetary
unions, especially in relation to the matter of political economy.
Under the AHMU, Austria and Hungary agreed to share a common market, trade
policy, legal system, army, foreign policy, and monarch (with the Emperor of Austria
serving as the King of Hungary). Each nation, however, would have its own national
parliament, government, and budget. In terms of monetary policy more specifically, it
was decided that the currency of the Austrian National Bank (ANB) would be legal
tender. In addition, the inconvertible notes of the ANB would be under the joint
guarantee of both governments, and Hungarians agreed not to create a bank of issue
that would be in competition with the ANB. The result was a Bde facto monetary
union^, with a number of devolved functions left in each national government,
including most fiscal issues. One interesting aspect of the AHMU was the ability of
the much smaller Hungary to exert influence over Austria in monetary bargaining,
largely through the threat of secession.
As Flandreau explained it: Consider a monetary union comprising a Blarge^
(Austria) and a Bsmall^ (Hungary) country. The common central bank delivers a range
of services that are valuable to both parts, but not equally. The exact mix of services
produced depends on the division of power. If power is proportional to size, the small
country has very little control over common decisions. It is bound by the discipline of
the union without being able to influence decision-making in a way that would address
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its own specific interests. Co-operation (that is, participation in the union) is sub-
optimal and the small country prefers to quit. Sustained co-operation requires that the
large country accepts a decision-making process in which the small country receives a
greater voting share than size alone would predict. Thus smaller Bnations^ influence
monetary unions disproportionately (Flandreau 2006).
According to Flandreau’s analysis, in a two-party monetary union, especially one
with low barriers to exit, there will be a tendency for the smaller member state to exert
an undue amount of influence over the workings of the union, through the threat of exit.
This certainly appears to have been the case under the AHMU, and Flandreau believes
that the result of such bargaining was that the monetary union was Bquite profitable to
Hungarians^. In 1878, the ANB was renamed the Austro-Hungarian National Bank,
and through this the new bank became a truly Bfederal institution^.
Like the LMU and the SMU, the AHMU disappeared under the impact of the First
World War, for a complex set of reasons, including the increased pressures placed upon
the broader economic scene by the strains of the war. The main lesson of the AHMU,
however, is about the nature of institutional structures. Two concepts are useful in
thinking about this: (1) the first concept is Albert Hirschman’s notion of BExit, Voice,
and Loyalty^ (Hirschman 1970). According to Hirschman, actors within an organisa-
tion face two choices when they perceive that the organisation is no longer serving their
interests and their loyalty to the organisation reduces: they can Bexit^ or, if they stay,
Bvoice^ their disapproval. Under the AHMU, Hungary’s threat of exit proved a potent
tool, which allowed them to a certain degree, to Bcapture^ the workings of the AHMU
in such a way as to ensure that they exercised a disproportionate amount of power
within the Austro-Hungarian National Bank. (2) The ability of a small-country player
to co-opt such an institution points to a broader set of concerns about the game theoretic
interaction of nations within a monetary union, including their asymmetric ability to
exert power and influence over the terms of the supranational agreement. Institutional
arrangements need to be designed to mitigate such concerns, and to prevent the ability
of nations to undue (and disproportionate) influence over the workings of a monetary
union, lest such actions lead to resentments, inefficient outcomes, or exits from the
organisation.
The lessons that may be drawn from the AHMU, therefore, are that, even if there
exist developed institutions of collaboration between the two units, there needs to be
safeguards against the possibility of moral blackmail (through threats of exit) from the
smaller entity. Had the First World War not intervened, the AHMU might have
developed along these lines.
5 The European monetary union (EMU)
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community
(EEC), through the creation of a customs union and other measures allowed for a
common market of goods, workers, and capital as well as for the determining of
common transport and agricultural policies. Although this is often interpreted as a
defeat for European federalism, in practice it laid the basis for the future development
of a kind of economic federalism. In the terms of European integration theory, this
phase was characterised by what would later became known as ‘intergovernmentalism’
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although the idea was already present in the International Relations theory of ‘realism’
applied to European integration by Stanley Hoffman (1966) rather than the ‘suprana-
tionalism’ that neo-functionalists such as Ernst Haas had thought would come about
(Haas 1958). Nevertheless, during the De Gaulle years (1958–1969 - the period
studied by Hoffman in his famous 1966 article), while it is true that European
integration slowed down and became primarily intergovernmental, it did not
completely cease.
Integration gathered momentum again with the election of the centrist and pro-
European Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to the French Presidency in 1974. He and German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt renewed the Franco-German axis and oriented the inte-
gration process in a more political direction. The context within which this took place
was the new situation of the world economy brought about by the collapse of the
Bretton Woods Agreement, the crisis of Keynesian economy policy, the rise of neo-
liberalism and the new phase of globalisation that resulted from these developments. It
was evident to many that individual European nation-states, even those with strong
economies such as West Germany, were disadvantaged when acting alone faced with
the powerful economic blocs emerging around the United States and Japan. For this
reason, in 1983, the European Roundtable of Industrialists, concerned with the loss of
European competitiveness called for the ‘relaunch’ of Europe. In1984, the European
Parliament adopted a report by the European federalist Altiero Spinelli as a Draft Treaty
Establishing the European Union. Although the member states quickly buried the plan,
it further enhanced the drive towards greater integration. It also assisted Jacques Delors,
who had been appointed President of the European Commission in the same year. It
was under Delors that the European Commission launched an explicit programme to
achieve monetary and economic union in a number of stages:
Stage 1: 1 July 1990–31 December 1993
1 July 1990: complete liberalisation of capital movements through the
abolition of exchange controls in the EEC.
1992: Treaty of Maastricht adopts the completion of the EMU as a formal
objective and the Treaty enters into force on 1 November 1993.
Maastricht established ‘convergence criteria’ on inflation, public finances
(debt), interest rates and exchange rate stability.
Stage 2: 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998
The European Monetary Institute established as the forerunner of the
ECB which comes into existence in June 1998.
1995: the name ‘Euro’ is adopted for the new currency.
June 1997: the European Council adopts the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) to ensure budgetary discipline of the new currency.
May 1998: the first eleven initial countries to participate in the Euro are
selected.
Stage 3: 1 January 1999 to the present
1 January 1999: the Euro becomes a real currency and the ECB estab-
lishes a single monetary policy for the Eurozone.
1 January 2002: Euro notes and coins are introduced.
More countries join: Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta
(2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2015).
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In 2018, the Eurozone comprises 19 members with 7 EU members are committed to
joining it eventually. Denmark has opted out and of course the UK is leaving the EU
after the Brexit vote in June 2016. This will mean a vast single currency area
comprising 26 countries. Six other countries – the micro-states of Andorra, Monaco,
San Marino and Vatican City and Kosovo and Montenegro – use the Euro as their
official currency, the first four having formal agreements with the EU to do so and the
last two unilaterally.
6 Brexit and European integration
Although it often has frictionswith the EU, theUK, as the second-largest economic entity
in the EU, a nuclear power, and permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, has been known as part of the EU troika alongwith France andGermany. Its role
is irreplaceable, particularly in EU diplomacy and defence policies. With Brexit, the EU,
as an important international actor, will inevitably see its role and influences decline.
Despite the fact that the UK does not use the Euro, Brexit will have important
implications for the EMU’s future. The UK’s significant financial sector and the loss of
its budgetary contributions will lead to numerous EU reforms in the wake of its exit.
The EU should take advantage of this. Encouraging the adoption of the Euro by current
euro-outs is a step in the right direction. While financial sector reforms are inevitable,
the EU should be mindful of the benefits that London’s financial markets have provided
in the past and not make Brexit unnecessarily disruptive. Finally, the EU should use
post-Brexit reforms as an opportunity to strengthen the Eurozone and make it more
robust against future crises.
There was something remarkable about the recent rapid progress of European
integration if one compares it with the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ of the 1960s and early
1970s. We have progressed from a situation where the European regime was little more
than an advanced ‘international regime’ marked by ‘intergovernmentalism’ to one
where many of the elements of a true European federation are now in place. In 2015,
we have a single market which includes all 28 member states, a single currency which
is used by the majority of member states and will eventually be used by all but two, a
European Central Bank, and a single monetary policy. Furthermore, the drive towards
the completion of the single market and EMU has brought in their wake a strengthening
of European institutions. The European Commission has played a key role in all of
these developments and there has been a strengthening of the European Parliament as
the co-decision maker with the European Council. Furthermore, the European Council
itself, while representing ‘national interests’ has increasingly adopted not a simple
‘national’ perspective but a truly European one or at least one in which ‘national’
interest is increasingly defined in European terms. This simply reflects the realities of
national governments in a complex, interdependent and globalised world. The EU has
developed a set of institutional mechanisms which both give expression to this com-
plexity but also allow the member states to retain a certain degree of autonomy. Besides
the supposed strengthening of EMU and the institutional developments that have
accompanied it, the process has also led to increasing the number of policy
areas that now fall within the competences of the EU. Examples include
education, the environment, social policy etc.
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7 The Eurozone crisis
When almost ten years of relative ease for the EMU’s single currency came to an abrupt
end with the start of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, the debate over the Euro’s
sustainability quickly turned to the question of whether there can be a monetary union
without some sort of fiscal union. According to Harold James, Europe’s financial crisis
cannot be blamed on the Euro. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems
that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s creation (James 2012).
The origins of the Eurozone crisis are explained in an informative study of the
Committee of Central Bank Governors, which became the ECB. The book follows the
process from preparation to execution of the concept of European monetary union and a
common currency. It helps to understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by
tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations. It was the constant tension between politicians
and technocrats that shaped the Euro (James 2012).
Drawing on newly available archives from the Committee of Central Bank Gover-
nors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, James shows that although the EMU has
grown and evolved, the lack of coordination in policymaking, complex decision
making, and the sheer number of interrelationships between monetary and economic
variables have led to serious problems. The EMU was originally seen as another
stepping stone to a politically unified Europe. Yet with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the unification of Germany, the need for
European political union as a means to ensure peace in Europe has largely disappeared.
Given fading desire for full political union, the Euro project has lost the prospect of a
stable platform in the foreseeable future (James 2012).
From the outset the Euro was a controversial construct. Design flaws in the
Eurozone were well known from its inception—including a lack of fiscal union and
no mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks and diverging competitiveness. How-
ever, political imperatives trumped economic concerns in the creation of a united states
of Europe, and the Euro was the showpiece of this political project. The constant media
reports of the EMU’s immediate demise continue unabated, and there are no quick fixes
to this complex situation. (James 2012).
This historical progression of economic and political integration has often been
described in ‘neo-functionalist’ terms. The theory was originally associated with Haas
(Haas 1958), but Haas coined the term to describe and explain the actual practices of
figures such as Jean Monnet in the 1950s. By the 1960s, perhaps influenced by the neo-
realist critique of Hoffman (Hoffman 1966) but also by the Euro-pessimism of the de
Gaulle period, Haas declared that the neo-functionalists had been mistaken (Haas
1958). Neo-functionalism, however, experienced a come-back in the 1990s as a result
of the accelerated integration (Rosamond 2005). Such neo-functionalist accounts of
European integration have sometimes been applied to the EMU and, especially, the
Euro. Certainly leading up to the introduction of the Euro, there was an expectation that
monetary union would ‘spill-over’ into greater fiscal and economic union. In 1991, the
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued in favour of such a process that ‘It is absurd to
expect in the long run that you can maintain economic and monetary union without
political union’ (Kohl 1991), while British Chancellor Nigel Lawson, arguing in
opposition to it, claimed that the EMU implied ‘nothing less than European govern-
ment…and political union, the United States of Europe’(Lawson 1989). These analyses
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need to be subjected to detailed empirical examination. It is likely that the actual
processes of economic, monetary and political integration actually became dissociated
from each other and were much more ‘messy’ than the neat neo-functionalist paradigm
of ‘spill-overs’ would suggest (Hodson and Quaglia 2009).
In particular, this threw into question whether the criteria for entry into the Euro,
which had been established at Maastricht, were applied sufficiently in certain cases,
especially in relation to Greece. Furthermore, even major players such as France and
Germany had failed to play by the rules that had been laid down, thus weakening the
case for their application to the economically weaker states on the periphery (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). When the crisis broke, there was even talk of the
collapse of the Euro or at least whether countries such as Greece would be forced out.
This leaves an important question as to whether the EU can survive as a system with
two or more distinctive fiscal policy regimes (i.e. the Eurozone + the UK and Denmark)
or whether the non-Euro states should really leave the Union.
8 The EMU and responses to the crisis
In response to the crisis, the EU pushed through a number of measures, including the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union (TSCG), better known as the BFiscal Compact^, which was signed by all EU
leaders except those from the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, and represent-
ed an important attempt to deal with some of the problems thrown up by the Eurozone
crisis.
The European Commission published a communication in November 2012 entitled
A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic union: launching a European debate
(European Comission 2012). This began by emphasising the benefits of EMU and the
creation of the single currency: the Euro is the world’s second largest reserve currency;
it has helped open up the internal market to more than 330 million citizens living in the
Eurozone; it enables immediate price comparisons across countries; it has eliminated
exchange rate risk and foreign transaction costs; it has facilitated a more efficient
distribution of resources; and it has become a powerful tool for growth.
At the same time, the Commission recognised some of the weaknesses of the initial
design of the EMU and the failure of states to adhere to the rules of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP): some Eurozone states had accumulated large private and public
debts; there were losses in competitiveness; and macro-economic imbalances. When
the 2008 crisis struck there were considerable contagion effects and the crisis turned
into a sovereign debt crisis. The Commission noted in particular that there was Bthe
lack of a tool to address systematically macroeconomic imbalances^. (European
Comission 2012). The communication identified the following issues both before and
since 2008:
(i) The SGP was insufficiently observed by the Member States and lacked robust
mechanisms to ensure sustainable public finances. The Member States did not use
periods of steady growth to pursue ambitious fiscal policies.
(ii) There was a reliance on Bsoft instruments^ – peer pressure and recommendations –
which had limited impact on the Member States.
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(iii) There was a moral hazard problem as expanding global financial markets in the
late 1990s provided a money supply which seemed to diminish risks.
(iv) There was a sharp increase in financial integration at the European level but, after
2008, a nationally segmented financial stability architecture. This led to inade-
quate coordination at all stages of the crisis.
The European Commission has played a key role in preserving the single market
against emerging protectionist tendencies and fragmentation. It advanced a European
Economy Recovery Programme with a series of legislative proposals which the
European Parliament endorsed. In December 2011, these proposals became known as
the Bsix-pack^: three Regulations strengthening the SGP; two Regulations introducing
a new budgetary surveillance measure; and one Directive imposing minimum standards
for national budgets. Furthermore, the Commission advocated that the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSGC) be incorporated into EU law within
five years and had already been working with the Parliament and the Council to
integrate some of its elements into EU law applicable to Eurozone Member States.
Next, the Commission introduced the Btwo-pack^ which consists of two Regulations to
reinforce both budgetary coordination and budgetary surveillance and aims at more
targeted prevention and corrective action in cases of deviation from SGP budgetary
requirements. This means the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In
other words, it moved from Bsoft^ instruments to more Bhard^ legal instruments.
These measures have taken shape with the introduction of new institutional
instruments:
& Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), which is a system of surveillance to
identify imbalances.
& A new Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), which is a system of intervention to
correct these imbalances.
& The European Semester, which means that surveillance of national budgets takes
place across all Eurozone states in the first six months of the calendar year and the
Commission provides policy advice to the states before they finalise their draft
budgets for the following year.
& The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) inaugurated in October 2012.
One additional measure deserves to be highlighted: the creation of a Banking Union
in order to end the disintegration of the EU’s financial market and in order to further the
completion of the EMU.
The European Commission provided a blueprint outlining a number of stages to
complete the EMU:
& In the short term (6–18 months): full deployment of the new economic governance
tools – the six-pack, the two-pack and the SSM – these do not require Treaty
changes.
& In the medium term (18 months to 5 years): further budgetary coordination;
deeper policy coordination in the field of taxation and employment; creation
of a proper fiscal capacity for the EMU. Some of these measures will
require Treaty amendments.
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& In the long term (beyond 5 years): progressive pooling of sovereignty and
responsibility for solidarity competences to the EU level; a deeply inte-
grated economic and fiscal governance framework to allow a common
issuance of public debt; perhaps introducing Stability Bonds on a Euro-wide
level.
The communication also pointed out that these developments imply a political union
and reinforced democratic legitimacy and accountability.
In June 2012, Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council,
having consulted the President of the Commission and the President of the
Parliament, prepared a report entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Mon-
etary Union that put forward a comprehensive vision of greater fiscal and
economic union, including an SSM, an increased degree of common decision-
making on national budgets, and a number of other measures for the absorption
of country-specific shocks (Van Rompuy 2012). In its meeting in December
2012, the European Council endorsed these moves, stating that it BAgreed on a
roadmap for the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union, based on
deeper integration and reinforced solidarity. This process will begin with the
completion, strengthening and implementation of the new enhanced economic
governance, as well as the adoption of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and
of the new rules on recovery and resolution and on deposit guarantees. This
will be completed by establishment of a single resolution mechanism^
(European Council 2012).
The Five Presidents report summarizes the debate on the Deep and Genuine
Economic and Monetary Union (Juncker 2015). The debate was launched
through the publication of the European Commission’s Communication on ‘A
Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU’ in November 2012 (European
Comission 2012). In comparison with the 2012 Communication, the Five
Presidents report is less ambitious because it does not contain a proposal of
debt mutualisation presented in the 2012 Blueprint. It would further undermine
fiscal discipline on national level, already compromised by several bail-outs of
the troubled countries and continuous breaching of fiscal criteria established by
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP).
All measures, which were to be adopted in the Stage 1 (between July 1,
2015 and June 30, 2017) as ‘Immediate Steps’, did not require changes in the
EU Treaties. They were implemented through either EU secondary legislation
or the Commission’s own decisions. This cannot be said about the Stage 2
(‘Completing the EMU Architecture’) that will require changes in the Treaties
although the time horizon proposed (until 2025) makes this potentially feasible
(if accepted by all EU member states).
The Five President’s Report anticipated the Eurozone having a treasury,
with tax and debt-raising powers and powers to spend. Such a treasury
function would clearly require political oversight. And indeed there is now
an on-going discussion about the establishment of democratic accountability
mechanisms within the Eurozone. The role of the ECB is of relevance in
this discussion.
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9 EMU governance and ECB accountability
If mutualisation of at least a part of member states’ debt issuance were to happen, the
Eurozone would be taking a big stride towards a large, liquid, integrated bond market
like that of the United States, which makes the Dollar such an attractive key currency.
As such, it would partly address the complaint that the Euro is a currency without a
state and so by definition lacks the independent fiscal capacity that is a fundamental
characteristic of a reserve currency (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 2016).
The ECB, in fact, is the least accountable central bank among advanced nations
(Werner 2006). There is no democratic accountability when the ECB strong-arms
governments into policy actions that go well beyond any reasonable interpretation of
its mandate. Not only is the ECB shielded from politicians, ECB statutes have also
placed it beyond the reach of democratic rules on bad behaviour. The ultimate control
politicians have over a central bank is the power to change its statutes and the power to
appoint governors. For example, in the case of Germany, a simple majority in the
Bundestag can change Bundesbank law. This procedure is absent in the Eurozone. The
statutes of the ECB can only be changed by revising the Maastricht Treaty, which
requires unanimity of all member states. The ECB today argues that the only institution
that has the right to limit its power is the European Court of Justice, which has an
activist Europhile interpretation of European treaties. The crisis has given the ECB
governing council such an increased power that no national government or national
institution can match it.
The project of European integration was not designed democratically, or at least not
in the way democracy is traditionally conceived in terms of placing ultimate law-
making authority in the hands of the people or their elected representatives. It is not
even meant to be democratically responsive in the way that term is usually understood.
Any democratic deficit that the EU suffers seems to many observers a deliberately
constructed one. So how could we control the ECB in the future? It needs to be placed
under a stricter and more direct supervision by democratically elected politicians. One
of the institutions the president of the ECB puts himself in front of, the European
Parliament, does not inspire anyone to believe that the ECB is being held accountable.
This very independence means that democratic governments now have no way to keep
the ECB accountable if it starts to violate its mandate (Feldstein 2012).
With almost prophetic insight German economist and former president of the
Bundesbank Karl Otto Pöhl wrote in 1988: BIn a monetary union with irreversibly
fixed exchange rates the weak would become ever weaker and the strong ever stronger.
We would thus experience great tensions in the real economy of Europe ... In order to
create a European currency, the governments and parliaments of Europe would have to
be prepared to transfer sovereign rights to a supranational institution^ (James 2012).
The ECB has become more powerful than the Fed, but with even less democratic
oversight. In the early stages of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB exercised its influence
through secret letters to troubled member states such as Ireland and Italy, laying down
conditions and implicitly threatening to withdraw support if they were not met. Now,
the bank exercises its power directly and in public (James 2012).
The EC B is at a crossroads. Its original mandate was to be an independent
technocratic institution, the legitimacy and credibility of which was set in terms of
meeting its price stability mandate— output legitimacy. However, from the outbreak of
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the sovereign debt crisis, ECB unconventional monetary policies had a significant
impact upon the direction of Eurozone member state macro-economic policies— and
in a manner that contradicted the ECB’s terms of delegation as outlined in the
Maastricht Treaty, thus also undermining its input legitimacy. In light of the political
salience of these policies and their impact, it is questionable whether the independence
of the ECB remains democratically viable. ECB policy-making has become problem-
atically controversial and politicized. At the very least, the reinforcement of European
parliamentary scrutiny over ECB policy making is more urgent than ever (Högenauer
and Howarth 2016).
10 Historical lessons for the EMU
Luca Einaudi has warned that comparisons between earlier monetary unions and the
EMU are Bmisleading to some extent^, since Btechnical aspects of money and political
background have changed radically^ (Einaudi 2000). Unlike in the nineteenth-century,
we are now in a world of fiat currencies, of tighter European political and institutional
integration, and of a vastly different system of national central banks. Despite this, a
few lessons can be gleaned for the contemporary EMU, in light of the memory of the
LMU, the SMU, and the AHMU:
(1) The fragility of monetary unions. One lesson from the historical record on
monetary unions is recognition of the fragility of such arrangements, especially in
the absence of other levers for fostering economic convergence and formal
coordination of member states’ economies. The LMU, the SMU, and the AHMU
all disappeared, for various reasons, often having to do with a lack of coordination
or too difficult financial circumstances, especially during the First World War.
(2) The importance of economic convergence for viable monetary union.Another
lesson from the historical record is the issue of economic convergence and
whether an Optimal Currency Area is an essential condition. But also whether
this should be a Bstrong^ OCA or a Bweak^ OCA as these terms were defined
above. The SMU provides, perhaps, the most potent example of this factor,
considering the Scandinavian nations’ lack of economic convergence throughout
their experience of monetary union. This helped to put pressures on the SMU,
which eventually aided in its dissolution. Ceteris paribus economic convergence is
an important element in a well-functioning monetary union. On the other hand,
the United States is an example of an OCAwhich was weak but which, despite the
Civil War and the currency collapse in the 1920s, has become a robust single
currency. What is perhaps remarkable about the Euro is that, despite the great
divergence across the EU’s economies, it was first of all established and, second,
has actually survived the most serious threat to its existence with the 2008
financial crisis. This suggests that certain key conditions have changed, particu-
larly those dealt with under (3) below.
(3) The importance of institutional safeguards to curb moral hazard and to
ensure deeper coordination. Another difficulty in monetary unions, highlighted
by the examples of the LMU and the SMU, in particular, is that of moral hazard. It
is important that monetary unions create institutional safeguards to prevent moral
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hazard and free-riding problems. Furthermore, the continuing existence of nation-
al interests in previous unions meant that it was difficult to coordinate fiscal and
economic policies across the member states.
(4) The relevance of Bnational^ interests. An important lesson, however, may be
drawn in the comparison between the nineteenth century and the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries: this is the changing role of the nation-state and of
national governments. The early period was actually the heyday of nation-state
nationalism, but this had considerably diminished by the last quarter of the
twentieth century. The drive towards EMU was possible only because the EU’s
Member States were willing to surrender certain aspects of sovereignty to the
supranational institutions. The EMU became, therefore, a much more deeply
integrated Union than was possible, at least across different countries in the earlier
period. In fact, it was only possible in a federation such as the United States or
Canada because there was a willingness to create a new overarching entity.
Although the EU is not yet a federation, it is developing into something quite
similar. This has been borne out by the progress made in devising institutional
responses to the crisis and the willingness to use it as a means of deepening
integration even further.
(5) Finally, there is the challenge of creating representative and strong
centralised institutions in a monetary union. Such institutions ought to be both
(a) representative and (b) able to battle issues of moral hazard. The experience of
the AHMU, in which Hungary was able to extort highly favourable terms through
threat of exit, points to the importance of political institutions in the creation of
any tenable monetary union. The current arrangement of the ECB, in fact, seems
poorly suited to this task at hand, in part because of precisely the sort of
misalignment of power seen in the AHMU.1
11 Conclusion
There is an urgent need for the Eurozone to address their problems such as the Greek
debt restructuring process as a matter of urgency or it could be a destabilising factor in
the international currency system. The Eurogroup failed to implement a definitive
solution to the Greek debt problem. This is yet more evidence that the current
institutional structure of the Eurozone/EU is unable to deal with the scale of economic
problems caused by an incomplete monetary union.
Nevertheless, EMU is different from the earlier experiences with monetary unifica-
tion that we have described in the three case studies above. It has created a single
1 At present, the ECB, headquartered in Frankfurt, has a system of voting rights that is grossly unrepresen-
tative. Proposed reforms to the system, while somewhat helpful in closing the gap between large and small
nations, introduce a curious system of rotation that will likely prove controversial to wealthy creditor nations,
especially Germany. The exclusion of Jens Weidmann, the president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, from voting
every fifth month will likely sit uneasily with Germans, considering both that the nation represents 30% of
Eurozone GDP and its crucial role in extending credit to PIIGS nations. The creation of a more representative
system for governing the Eurozone is a sine qua non for the EU, an institution that has continually been
dogged by criticisms of its Bdemocratic deficit^. BVoting Rights at the ECB: New Club Rules^ in The
Economist (12–20 December 2013), 72–5
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currency, the Euro, and a common monetary authority, the ECB. No one can predict
with certainty which way this crisis will turn from here. There are no precedents for the
challenges Europe faces. Historical experiences of currency crises are not really
applicable because the Eurozone is an unprecedented construct. However, the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council have, in fact,
embarked on an ambitious programme not just to keep the single currency afloat but
to develop a set of institutional mechanisms that are designed to remedy some of the
weaknesses of the original design.
This on-going uncertainty limits Eurozone reform and renewed tensions with France
and countries like Greece who may be forced to exit the Euro. There is also a possibility
of a hard Brexit because of benign neglect on behalf of the EU and the incapability of
the UK to engage constructively because of internal divisions within the governing
conservative party.
The Eurozone, in its relatively short time of existence, has successfully overcome a
number of crisis periods. As the political landscape is changing, it will be difficult to
develop more constructive and proactive solutions for the Eurozone crisis, such as debt
restructuring, than was the case with the ‘muddling-through’ approach that has
characterised the Eurozone crisis strategy in the last few years, especially in Greece.
The ECB epitomizes that perceived ‘democratic deficit’ run by an unaccountable
bureaucracy that poses serious problems for the future of the Eurozone.
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